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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Roger Peter Buehl appeals the denial of his petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus. Convicted in state court for a triple 
homicide, Buehl claims that his due process rights were 
violated and that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel at trial and on direct appeal. Because we conclude 
that Buehl's due process rights were not violated and that 
his ineffective assistance claims fail to meet the standard of 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), we affirm 
the judgment of the District Court. 
 
I. 
 
On July 16, 1982, police found the bodies of Courtland 
Gross, his wife Alexandra Gross, and their housekeeper 
Catherine VanderVeur shot to death at the Gross estate in 
Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. The police determined 
that the murders had occurred in the afternoon or early 
evening of July 15. The killings appeared to have been 
carried out as part of a robbery, since drawers had been 
pulled out of cabinets in several rooms and a cloth covering 
a safe in the basement had been pulled aside to reveal the 
dial and handles. The safe was unopened. 
 
The victims at the Gross residence had been shot with 
.380 caliber bullets, and the police recovered six .380 
caliber cartridge casings from the rooms in which the 
victims were found. The police found Mr. Gross's body near 
the top of a flight of steps that led to the cellar. He had 
been shot in the right foot, the abdomen, and the cheek. 
Mrs. Gross had been shot in the elbow and the eye. Mrs. 
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VanderVeur, who was found tied to a chair in a bedroom, 
had been shot once in the head. There were no 
eyewitnesses to these murders, but the Commonwealth 
assembled the following circumstantial evidence against 
Buehl. 
 
In June 1982, an acquaintance of Buehl's named Francis 
Kelly purchased a .380 caliber Walther PPK handgun. Kelly 
test-fired the gun at a junkyard on or about June 7.1 In 
August, after the murders of the Gross household, Kelly 
returned to the junkyard with a police officer who retrieved 
two .380 shell casings for ballistics analysis. This analysis 
revealed that the shell casings from the junkyard were fired 
from the gun used in the murders at the Gross estate. 
 
On July 7, Joseph Dwyer stole a red Buick Skylark in the 
City of Philadelphia. Dwyer damaged the Buick's front left 
tire and lost the tire's hubcap, and he then sold the car to 
Kelly the next day. On July 10, Kelly lent both the Walther 
PPK handgun and the Buick to Buehl. Dwyer saw Buehl in 
possession of the PPK and the Buick that same day. Buehl 
told Dwyer that he intended to commit robberies on Pine 
Street in Philadelphia and in Montgomery County, where he 
would force people to "open the safe." Buehl invited Dwyer 
to help in these robberies, but Dwyer declined. 
 
On July 13, Buehl purchased 50 cartridges of 
ammunition for the PPK at Pearson's Sporting Goods Store. 
Because Buehl initially purchased ammunition that was 
incompatible with the PPK, he exchanged his original 
purchase for compatible ammunition and received a credit 
slip in the amount of $4.50. Buehl signed the form required 
to buy the ammunition, but his signature was illegible. The 
store's assistant manager therefore asked for Buehl's 
driver's license and printed Buehl's name on the form. This 
manager later identified Buehl as the man who purchased 
the ammunition. 
 
After Buehl purchased ammunition for the PPK, he used 
the Buick and the gun to rob the Good Scents Shop on Pine 
Street in Philadelphia. During the robbery, Buehl shot 
Nathan Cohn in the ankle and exclaimed: "I'm not playing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. All of the dates mentioned are in 1982. 
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around." As Buehl left the store, he told an employee: "If 
anybody comes out here, I'll blow your eyes out." Buehl was 
observed leaving the store and driving away in the Buick. 
Buehl admitted to this robbery, and a ballistics analysis 
determined that the shell casings ejected from the PPK at 
the store were fired in the same gun as that used at the 
junkyard and the Gross residence. 
 
On July 15 at around 2:00 p.m., David Mazzocco 
witnessed a red car that was missing its front left hubcap 
driving slowly down Berks Road in Worcester Township. 
Around this same time, Richard Kirkpatrick returned home 
to find a red Buick Skylark parked in the driveway of his 
home on Berks Road. When he entered his home, 
Kirkpatrick was accosted by a man with a pistol. This 
gunman told Kirkpatrick: "I've shot two other people. I'll 
shoot you also. I'll start with your leg and work up." He also 
warned Kirkpatrick: "I'm not fooling." The robber took 
jewelry from Kirkpatrick's house and fled. Kirkpatrick 
initially identified a photograph of someone other than 
Buehl as the robber and made no identification at Buehl's 
trial. However, on the same day as the Kirkpatrick robbery, 
Buehl sold jewelry stolen from the Kirkpatrick home to a 
jeweler in Philadelphia. Moreover, a ballistics expert 
determined that the .380 cartridge casings found at the 
Kirkpatrick home came from the gun that was fired at the 
junkyard, the Pine Street robbery, and the Gross residence. 
 
The Kirkpatrick home is less than a half hour away by 
car from the Gross residence. At approximately 2:30 p.m. 
on July 15, an elderly woman wearing a straw hat and a 
flowered dress bought a box of Domino powdered sugar at 
the Liberty Bell Meat Market near the Gross residence. 
When the police discovered Mrs. Gross's body at her home, 
she was wearing a flowered dress, and a straw hat was 
found near her head. A box of Domino sugar was in a paper 
bag with the receipt on the kitchen counter. Catherine 
Fitzgerald, who cleaned house for the Gross family, testified 
that Mrs. Gross always put groceries away as soon as she 
came home. 
 
Between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. on July 15, Buehl arrived at 
Joseph LaMotte's office in an agitated state and asked if he 
could borrow LaMotte's gray Datsun because he had "just 
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pulled a job" and "had to go back and wipe off the 
fingerprints." Buehl told LaMotte that he could not drive 
the red Buick because he was afraid of being stopped by 
the police. When LaMotte refused to loan Buehl his car, 
Buehl said: "Look, this is my life we're talking about. I just 
wasted three people and I want your car." LaMotte noticed 
that Buehl had a gun in his waistband and asked where 
Buehl had gotten it. Buehl replied that he had obtained it 
from Kelly. LaMotte loaned Buehl his car but said that he 
needed it back at about 5:00 p.m. Buehl told LaMotte that 
he would be driving to Conshohocken. A police officer 
testified at trial that the Conshohocken exit of the 
Schuylkill Expressway is about 1.5 miles from the Gross 
residence. The officer also testified that it was possible to 
drive from the Gross residence to LaMotte's office in 36 
minutes, observing all speed limits. At about 4:45 p.m., 
Buehl called LaMotte to say that he was on the way back. 
At about 5:00 p.m., a witness near the Gross residence 
observed a small gray car that appeared to be a Datsun 
speeding toward the expressway. Buehl returned to meet 
LaMotte near his office between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m. Buehl 
still had a pistol in his waistband. LaMotte and Buehl then 
picked up Mary Treat, who testified that Buehl looked 
nervous. 
 
On July 17, Buehl called LaMotte from Atlantic City and 
asked him about "any big burglaries or anything on the 
news." When LaMotte said that he didn't remember any 
such news, Buehl said: "Think. It's important." LaMotte 
then inquired whether Buehl knew anything about an 
attempted burglary in which three people were killed, but 
Buehl did not answer. 
 
On that same day, Buehl met a man named Duon Miller 
in Atlantic City. Miller noticed that Buehl had in his 
possession a gold money clip engraved with the image of St. 
Christopher. Mrs. Gross carried a gold money clip with 
such an engraving, but it was missing after her murder. 
Miller testified that Buehl told him that he had killed people 
with a PPK and had thrown it into a lake or river. Buehl 
asked Miller if he had ever heard of the Gross family, and 
he offered Miller the gold St. Christopher money clip. Miller 
testified that he and Buehl argued about money and that 
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Buehl threatened to "get his PPK and come back and blow 
[Miller] away." 
 
Peter Ross met Buehl on July 19 in the Tropicana Hotel 
in Atlantic City. Ross observed Buehl arguing with Miller 
and threatening to kill him with a PPK. Buehl told Ross 
that he had Miller's vehicle registration and thus could 
track Miller down and kill him. Buehl also told Ross that he 
had killed people before, and he asked if Ross wanted him 
to kill anyone. 
 
Buehl was arrested on July 30, 1982 for burglary. At the 
time of his arrest, Buehl had in his possession the credit 
slip from Pearson's Sporting Goods Store; a paper with 
Miller's name, address and phone number; and Miller's 
vehicle registration. A police officer testified at trial that, 
while Buehl was being transferred to Broadmeadows 
prison, Buehl asked one of the detectives if the police could 
match shell casings. 
 
Based on this evidence, Buehl was convicted of thefirst 
degree murder of Mr. and Mrs. Gross and Mrs. VanderVeur,2 
and he was sentenced to death. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court affirmed Buehl's conviction on direct review. 
Commonwealth v. Buehl, 508 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1986). Buehl 
then filed a petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction 
Relief Act (PCRA), which was denied by the state trial court. 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial 
court's decision. Commonwealth v. Buehl, 658 A.2d 771 (Pa. 
1995). Thereafter, Buehl filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in federal court, seeking relief with respect to both 
the guilt and penalty phases of the state proceedings. The 
District Court granted habeas relief with respect to the 
penalty phase of Buehl's trial and ordered a new penalty 
hearing. The Commonwealth did not appeal that ruling. 
However, the District Court denied Buehl's petition insofar 
as it sought a new trial on the guilt phase of the state 
proceedings, and Buehl then took the present appeal. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. He was also convicted of several lesser offenses. 
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II. 
 
A. Buehl's ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We 
turn first to Buehl's contention that his Sixth Amendment 
rights were violated because his trial and appellate counsel 
were ineffective. Because Buehl filed his federal habeas 
petition prior to the enactment of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), this case 
must be decided under the law as it existed before the 
AEDPA became effective. See Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 
2059, 2068 (1997) (stating that the AEDPA's amendments 
to Chapter 153 of Title 28 generally apply only to cases filed 
after the AEDPA became effective); Death Row Prisoners of 
Pennsylvania v. Ridge, 106 F.3d 35 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(concluding that Pennsylvania is not an "opt-in" state for 
purposes of the AEDPA and that therefore the AEDPA's 
amendments to Chapter 154 of Title 28 do not apply to 
habeas petitions in capital cases from Pennsylvania). Under 
that law, ineffective assistance of counsel claims present 
mixed questions of law and fact. See Berryman v. Morton, 
100 F.3d 1089, 1095 (3d Cir. 1996); McAleese v. 
Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 1993). State court 
findings of fact are presumed correct if they are fairly 
supported by the record, see 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d) (1994); 
Berryman, 100 F.3d at 1094, but "[a]n effectiveness claim 
require[s] the application of a legal standard to the 
historical-fact determinations," and thus the ultimate 
question whether counsel was effective is a uniquely legal 
conclusion subject to de novo review. See id. at 1095 
(quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 310 n.6 (1963)); 
United States v. Cleary, 46 F.3d 307, 309-10 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 890 (1995). 
 
We review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
under the two-pronged test announced in Strickland v. 
Washington, supra. Under that standard, the defendant 
must first show that his counsel's performance was so 
deficient that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. 466 
U.S. at 688. "This requires showing that counsel made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
`counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment." Id. at 687. In evaluating counsel's 
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performance, we are "highly deferential" and "indulge a 
strong presumption" that, under the circumstances, 
counsel's challenged actions "might be considered sound 
. . . strategy." Id. at 689; see also Sistrunk v. Vaughn, 96 
F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 1996). Because counsel is afforded 
a wide range within which to make decisions without fear 
of judicial second-guessing, we have cautioned that it is 
"only the rare claim of ineffectiveness of counsel that 
should succeed under the properly deferential standard to 
be applied in scrutinizing counsel's performance." United 
States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702, 711 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
If a defendant succeeds in establishing that his or her 
counsel's performance was deficient, the defendant must 
then show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense. "This requires showing that counsel's errors were 
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To 
satisfy this test, it must be shown that "there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." Id. at 694. Both prongs of the Strickland test 
must be met before the defendant may obtain relief. United 
States v. Nino, 878 F.2d 101, 103-104 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
B. Trial counsel's alleged failure to request a limiting 
instruction. Buehl's first Sixth Amendment claim is that his 
trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to 
request a limiting instruction with respect to certain "other 
crimes" evidence. The Commonwealth introduced evidence 
of the Pine Street and Kirkpatrick robberies to identify 
Buehl as the killer,3. and at this stage, Buehl does not 
maintain that the admission of this evidence to establish 
identity was improper. Buehl contends, however, that his 
trial attorney was ineffective because he neglected to 
request a limiting instruction. The District Court assumed 
that Buehl's trial counsel failed to request a limiting 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Buehl argues that his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to 
object 
to inadmissible evidence regarding other crimes and bad acts. We 
address this argument separately in part III of this opinion. 
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instruction and stated that this failure was a "serious lapse 
in . . . assistance." Buehl v. Vaughn, No. 95-5917, slip op. 
at 37 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 1996). However, the District Court 
concluded that Buehl did not receive ineffective assistance 
of counsel because his defense was not sufficiently 
prejudiced to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test. 
The Court stated that "the evidence of [Buehl's] guilt was so 
strong that it rendered any such error harmless and[thus] 
there was no prejudice." Id. 
 
As noted above, the first issue in analyzing Buehl's 
ineffectiveness claim is whether his trial counsel's 
performance fell outside the wide bounds of reasonably 
competent assistance. When evidence of a defendant's other 
crimes is introduced to show identity, there is"sometimes 
. . . a substantial danger of unfair prejudice" because the 
jury may consider the evidence as proof of bad character or 
propensity to commit the crime charged. United States v. 
Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 
S. Ct. 254 (1998). To alleviate this risk, counsel may 
request a cautionary instruction. See generally Lesko v. 
Owens, 881 F.2d 44, 55 (3d Cir. 1989), cert . denied, 493 
U.S. 1036 (1990). In some circumstances, such an 
instruction may be strongly advisable; in others, counsel 
may reasonably conclude that it is strategically preferable 
to omit such a request since the instruction might have the 
undesired effect of highlighting the other crimes evidence. 
 
In this case, there has been some uncertainty throughout 
Buehl's post-trial litigation as to whether his trial attorney 
did in fact request a limiting instruction. As the District 
Court noted, the Court of Common Pleas, in ruling on 
Buehl's PCRA petition, stated that Buehl's lawyer requested 
a limiting instruction with regard to the Pine Street and 
Kirkpatrick robberies but that the trial court inadvertently 
neglected to give one. See Buehl v. Vaughn, No. 95-5917, 
slip op. at 37 & n.7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 1996). The District 
Court, however, assumed that the Court of Common Pleas 
was in error on this point because, when the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court reviewed the Court of Common Pleas' 
decision on appeal, the Justices appeared to take it for 
granted that Buehl's trial counsel had not sought such an 
instruction. See id. 
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From our review of the record, we conclude that Buehl's 
trial counsel did in fact request that the trial judge caution 
the jury about the proper use of the evidence in question. 
The record contains a colloquy between trial counsel and 
the court that was conducted in chambers following the 
jury charge. In that discussion, Buehl's counsel complained 
that he had previously asked the court "to instruct the jury 
that [the murders at the Gross estate] have nothing to do 
with [the robberies at] Worchester Township or Pine Street" 
but that the court neglected to give this instruction. Joint 
App. at 180-81. The judge responded that he realized that 
he had "not restricted [the jury's] purview to the homicides 
of the Grosses." Id. at 181. This colloquy is somewhat 
confusing because it refers to a request that Buehl's 
counsel apparently made in an unrecorded pre-instruction 
conference and because the objection was bound up with a 
discussion of a separate issue, i.e., whether the judge's 
charge had improperly implied to the jury that the 
homicides legally qualified as murders. Nevertheless, we 
believe that the record shows that Buehl's counsel did in 
fact request that the trial judge instruct the jury on the 
proper use of the evidence of Buehl's other crimes.4 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Buehl's counsel requested that the court address his objections by 
cautiously instructing the jury in a way that would avoid "highlighting" 
the court's alleged errors. Joint App. 181. The court's clarifying 
instruction stated: 
 
       If I inadvertently used any loaded nouns, pronouns or adjectives 
let 
       me caution you that all the charges surround incidents alleged to 
       have occurred on 7/15/82 at 1230 Arrowmink Road, the residence 
       of Mr. and Mrs. Courtland Gross and Catherine VanderVeur. The 
       charges arise out of the alleged three killings and with respect to 
the 
       responsibility, degree and proof of these alleged crimes are for 
you, 
       the jury, as fact finders and are to be determined from the 
evidence 
       and the evidence alone. Any language by me or counsel referring to 
       these incidents are terms used by me or counsel, and are not to 
       infringe on your fact finding function in any way whatsoever. 
 
Joint App. at 184-85. 
 
This instruction only briefly cautioned the jury to focus on the killings 
at the Gross residence and not any acts committed elsewhere. However, 
Buehl has taken the position that his counsel never requested a limiting 
instruction; he has not argued that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing 
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trial judge responded to this objection by giving a brief 
supplementary instruction that Buehl has not challenged in 
this appeal. 
 
As stated above, when a state prisoner's habeas petition 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel is considered 
under pre-AEDPA law, state court findings of fact made in 
the course of determining the ineffectiveness claim are 
subject to deference so long as they are fairly supported by 
the record. See, e.g., Berryman, 100 F.3d at 1094-95. Here, 
although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that 
Buehl's counsel failed to request a cautionary instruction, 
the Court did not discuss the record or acknowledge that 
the Court of Common Pleas had found that trial counsel 
made such a request, see Buehl, 658 A.2d at 777-79, and 
our review of the record convinces us that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court's contrary statement is not fairly supported 
by the record. Accordingly, since the record reveals that 
Buehl's counsel did request a limiting instruction and that 
the trial court was aware of his request, we reject Buehl's 
argument that his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
request an instruction. 
 
Moreover, even if the manner in which trial counsel 
handled the issue of the limiting instruction fell below Sixth 
Amendment standards, we agree with the District Court's 
conclusion that Buehl cannot satisfy Strickland's prejudice 
prong. See Buehl, No. 95-5917, slip op. at 37, 54-59 (E.D. 
Pa. Dec. 31, 1996).5 In view of the magnitude of the 
 
(Text continued on page 13) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
to object to this remedial instruction. Moreover, given counsel's 
reasonable concern that the court not highlight the evidence of other 
crimes or the court's use of the term "murders," the failure to object to 
the instruction would not fall outside the wide bounds of professionally- 
competent assistance. 
 
5. Noting that "[t]he verdict in this case had overwhelming support," the 
District Court summarized the evidence as follows: 
 
       Petitioner admitted to having committed the robbery at the Good 
       Scents Shop with a Walther PPK, and the bullet casings found at 
       that site were fired from the same gun that was used in crimes two 
       days later at the Kirkpatrick residence and the Gross estate. On 
the 
       day of the Good Scents Shop robbery, Petitioner purchased 
       ammunition for the Walther at a sporting goods shop. 
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       On the afternoon of the murders, Petitioner came to Joseph 
       LaMotte's office asking to borrow LaMotte's car. He told LaMotte he 
       had "just pulled a job" and "had to go back and wipe off the 
       fingerprints." When LaMotte refused his request, Petitioner said, 
       "Look, this is my life we're talking about. I just wasted three 
people 
       and I want your car." LaMotte noticed that Petitioner had a gun in 
       the waistband of his jeans. LaMotte lent Petitioner his car, a 
small 
       grey Datsun, and told him he needed the car back about 5:00 p.m. 
       A car matching the description of the one LaMotte lent Petitioner 
       was seen speeding from the direction of the Gross estate toward the 
       direction of the expressway to Philadelphia at about 5:00 p.m. on 
       the day of the murders. Petitioner returned LaMotte's car between 
       5:15 and 5:30. 
 
       There was evidence linking Petitioner to the robbery at the 
       Kirkpatrick residence, which was committed on the same afternoon 
       as the murders at the Gross estate and with the same gun. The day 
       of the robbery at the Good Scents Shop, Petitioner told LaMotte he 
       was driving a red Buick, and LaMotte saw the car from his office 
       window. A red Buick Skylark had been stolen several days before 
       the robbery at the Good Scents Shop; at the time it was recovered, 
       it had a missing left front hubcap. A similar car had been seen 
near 
       the Good Scents Shop at the time of the robbery there. A witness 
       saw a man he later identified as Petitioner run from the area of 
the 
       Good Scents Shop at the time of the robbery and speed away in a 
       red Buick Skylark. The man, whom the witness later identified as 
       Petitioner, was carrying a shopping bag. A similar red car, missing 
       a left front hubcap, was also seen on Kirkpatrick's street and a 
red 
       Skylark was seen at the Kirkpatrick residence at about the time of 
       the robbery there. Items stolen at the Kirkpatrick and Gross 
       residences were linked to Petitioner. The evening of the robbery at 
       the Kirkpatrick residence, Petitioner sold some jewelry to a 
jeweler 
       in Philadelphia, and most of it was later identified as having been 
       stolen in the robbery at the Kirkpatricks' residence. A gold St. 
       Christopher money clip that Mrs. Gross always used was missing 
       when her body was found. Duon Miller testified that Petitioner had 
       tried to give him a gold St. Christopher money clip, that he had 
       refused, but that he later found the clip in his car and put it in 
his 
       brief case. Another witness, Eros Peter Simone, saw such a money 
       clip in Miller's briefcase in Zurich some days later. 
 
       There were similarities in the crimes committed at the Good Scents 
       Shop, the Kirkpatrick residence, and the Gross estate. In all 
three, 
       robbery appeared to be the motive, the same gun was used, and in 
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evidence that the Commonwealth presented, Buehl cannot 
show that the absence of a limiting instruction deprived 
him a "a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
 
It is firmly established that a court must consider the 
strength of the evidence in deciding whether the Strickland 
prejudice prong has been satisfied. In Strickland, the 
Supreme Court emphasized that "a court hearing an 
ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the 
evidence before the judge or jury." Id. at 695. This is 
necessary because Strickland's prejudice prong requires a 
court to determine whether there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the 
trial would have been different. See Flamer v. Delaware, 68 
F.3d 710, 728, 730 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Lockhart v. 
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 368-69, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842 (1993); 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 1088 (1996); Todaro v. Fulcomer, 944 F.2d 
1079, 1085 (3d Cir. 1991). A court simply cannot make this 
determination without considering the strength of the 
evidence against the accused. As the Supreme Court stated 
in Strickland, "a verdict or conclusion only weakly 
supported by the record is more likely to have been affected 
by errors than one with overwhelming record support." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. We note that every other 
circuit has also recognized that, in analyzing Strickland's 
prejudice prong, a court must consider the magnitude of 
the evidence against the defendant. See, e.g., Huffington v. 
Nuth, 140 F.3d 572, 578 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 
444 (1998); Totten v. Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 
1998); United States v. Ortiz, 136 F.3d 161, 166-67 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Prows, 118 F.3d 686, 692-93 
(10th Cir. 1997); Hays v. Alabama, 85 F.3d 1492, 1496 
(11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1262 (1997); United 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       the first two robberies, there was substantial evidence that the 
same 
       car was used. In all three, the robber shot or threatened to shoot 
       someone in the leg or foot, and there was evidence of a plan of 
       shooting a victim first in a lower limb and working up to the head 
       or eye. In addition, there were numerous other more minor items of 
       evidence that further strengthened the prosecution's case. 
 
Buehl, No. 95-5917, slip op. at 37, 54-59 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 1996). 
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States v. Gregory, 74 F.3d 819, 823 (7th Cir. 1996); Scarpa 
v. DuBois, 38 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 
U.S. 1129 (1995); United States v. Royal, 972 F.2d 643, 650 
(5th Cir. 1992) ("The overwhelming evidence of Defendant's 
guilt further supports our conclusion that he suffered no 
prejudice as a result of his counsel's performance."), cert. 
denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993); Strouse v. Leonardo, 928 F.2d 
548, 556 (2d Cir. 1991); Otey v. Grammer, 859 F.2d 575, 
580 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031 (1990); 
Krist v. Foltz, 804 F.2d 944, 947 (6th Cir. 1986). We thus 
agree with the District Court that Buehl is not entitled to 
habeas relief based on trial counsel's failure to request a 
limiting instruction relating to the other crimes evidence.6 
 
C. Appellate counsel's failure to argue on dir ect appeal 
that trial counsel was ineffective in not seeking a limiting 
instruction. Buehl's next argument is that his right to 
effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, see Evitts v. 
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393-94 (1985), was violated because 
the attorney who represented him at that stage failed to 
argue that trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance 
in neglecting to request the cautionary instruction 
discussed above. In making this argument, Buehl relies 
chiefly on the manner in which the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court treated this argument when Buehl raised it in his 
appeal from the denial of his PCRA petition. Six justices 
heard the appeal, and as previously noted, all of them seem 
to have proceeded on the erroneous assumption that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In arguing that the Strickland's prejudice prong is met in this case, 
Buehl contends that in his appeal from the denial of PCRA relief a 
majority of the Justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded 
that this prong was satisfied. Buehl's brief (which was filed prior to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Lindh) then argues that "if the habeas 
statute requires deference because the state courtfinding is factual in 
nature or because deference is otherwise to be accorded to this state 
court resolution of a legal issue, petitioner must prevail." Appellant's 
Br. 
at 21. In Part II C of this opinion (dealing with Buehl's contention that 
his appellate counsel was ineffective), we will address in some detail the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's discussion of the prejudicial effect of trial 
counsel's asserted error. For present purposes, however, it is enough to 
note that under the pre-AEDPA version of 28 U.S.C.S 2254, a state 
court's conclusion regarding either prong of the Strickland test must be 
reviewed de novo. Berryman, 100 F.3d at 1094. 
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Buehl's trial attorney never requested a cautionary 
instruction. The plurality, in an opinion written by Justice 
Montemuro and joined by Justices Zappala and Castille, 
first stated that Buehl's "trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to request a cautionary instruction regarding these 
crimes because it cannot be said with any reasonable 
certainty that but for the this [sic] omission the outcome of 
[Buehl's] trial would not have been different." 658 A.2d at 
778-79. The plurality noted, however, that under a 
provision of the PCRA, a defendant in Buehl's position was 
entitled to relief "only in those instances in which counsel's 
ineffectiveness `so undermined the truth-determining 
process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence 
could have taken place.' " 658 A.2d at 779 (quoting 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. S 9543(a)(2)(ii) (West 1998)). The plurality 
then wrote: 
 
       In the instant case, the circumstantial evidence 
       presented by the Commonwealth, including the 
       evidence linking the bullets and shell casings from the 
       robberies of the Good Scents Shop and the Kirkpatrick 
       home to the murder weapon, created overwhelming 
       evidence of Appellant's guilt. Thus, while we are able to 
       say that due to the prejudicial nature of the evidence 
       in question the outcome of Appellant's trial may have 
       been different had counsel requested a cautionary 
       instruction, we are unable to say that due to this 
       omission the adjudication of guilt is unreliable. As a 
       result, appellant's claim does not constitute a basis for 
       relief under the PCRA. 
 
658 A.2d at 779 (footnote omitted). 
 
In a concurrence, Chief Justice Nix stated that he did not 
see "a substantive distinction between the prejudice prong 
of the test for ineffectiveness of counsel and the language 
contained in 42 Pa.C.S. S 9543(a)(2)(ii)" on which the 
plurality relied. 658 A.2d at 782. Pointing to the 
"overwhelming proof of [Buehl's] guilt," Chief Justice Nix 
concluded that Buehl had not "met his burden of 
establishing that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to 
request a cautionary instruction." 658 A.2d at 782-83 (Nix, 
C.J., concurring). 
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Justice Cappy, joined by then-Justice Flaherty, 
dissented. 658 A.2d at 783-86 (Cappy J., dissenting). Like 
Chief Justice Nix, Justice Cappy saw no difference between 
the prejudice prong of the test for ineffective assistance of 
counsel and the PCRA provision cited by the plurality. Id. 
at 785. Referring to Justice Montemuro's opinion, he wrote 
that "[t]he Majority does not explain why the adjudication of 
guilt is reliable if the outcome would have been different." 
Id. (emphasis in original). Then, without discussing the 
evidence against Buehl, he concluded that the PCRA 
petition should have been granted. Id. at 786. 
 
Based on these opinions, Buehl argues that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because, 
if the attorney who represented him at that stage had 
argued that trial counsel had rendered ineffective 
assistance in failing to request a cautionary instruction, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would have reversed his 
conviction and ordered a new trial. Looking at the votes of 
the justices in the PCRA appeal, Buehl states: "Three 
Justices stated that a new trial would have been ordered if 
the issue was raised on direct appeal and two Justices 
would have ordered a new trial on direct or collateral 
attack." Appellant's Br. at 23. 
 
We reject Buehl's argument because he has not satisfied 
the first prong of the Strickland test. In order to meet the 
requirements of that prong, he was required to show that 
his appellate counsel's failure to raise the cautionary 
instruction argument on appeal fell outside "the wide range 
of reasonable professional assistance; that is,[he would 
have to] overcome the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered 
sound [appellate] strategy.' " Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 
(citation omitted). One element of effective appellate 
strategy is the exercise of reasonable selectivity in deciding 
which arguments to raise. In this case, an appellate 
attorney familiar with the record could not have ethically 
argued that trial counsel's handling of the cautionary 
instruction issue was constitutionally deficient without 
calling to the attention of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
the passages in the record that we discussed above and 
that convince us that Buehl's trial attorney did in fact 
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request a cautionary instruction. Knowing this, a 
competent appellate attorney could have reasonably 
concluded he was unlikely to convince the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court that trial counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective in his handling of the cautionary instruction 
issue and that it was strategically inadvisable to select that 
argument as one of those to be raised. Furthermore, even 
if appellate counsel believed that he could convince the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court that trial counsel's 
performance was deficient, appellate counsel could have 
reasonably concluded that it was unlikely that he could 
satisfy Strickland's prejudice prong and that it was 
therefore strategically unwise to select this argument as 
one of those to be raised. 
 
As previously noted, our examination of the record 
convinces us that there is no reasonable probability that 
the jury's verdict would have been any different if a more 
explicit cautionary instruction had been given. After 
carefully reviewing the record, the District Court reached 
the same conclusion. And while we have given careful 
consideration to the opinions written by Justices 
Montemuro and Cappy in Buehl's PCRA appeal, those 
opinions do not convince that competent appellate counsel 
could not have concluded that the likelihood of satisfying 
Strickland's prejudice prong was not high enough to justify 
raising the argument in question. We note that Justice 
Montemuro characterized that evidence against Buehl as 
"overwhelming" and that Justice Cappy's opinion does not 
discuss the evidence and does not explain why there is a 
reasonable probability that a stronger or more explicit 
cautionary instruction would have caused the jury to 
return a different verdict. Consequently, we hold that 
appellate counsel did not render constitutionally ineffective 
assistance. 
 
D. Pennsylvania Supreme Court's alleged violat ion of due 
process. In conjunction with his Sixth Amendment 
argument regarding his representation on direct appeal, 
Buehl raises a related due process issue. Buehl contends 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court violated his due 
process rights because the plurality's interpretation of the 
standard for obtaining PCRA relief was "untenable or 
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amounts to a subterfuge to avoid federal review of a 
constitutional violation." Appellant's Br. at 25-26. As 
previously noted, the plurality invoked 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. S 9543(a)(2)(ii) (West 1998), which authorizes PCRA 
relief for "[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the 
circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the 
truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of 
guilt or innocence could have taken place." Buehl suggests 
that the plurality deliberately ignored another provision of 
the same statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 9543(a)(2)(v) 
(repealed 1995), which permitted relief to be granted for "[a] 
violation of the provisions of the Constitution, law or 
treaties of the United States which would require the 
granting of Federal habeas corpus relief to a State 
prisoner." Indeed, Buehl charges that the plurality went "so 
far as to ellipse [this provision] out of the statutory 
quotation in its opinion . . . ." Appellant's Br. at 26. Buehl 
contends that the plurality's misinterpretation of the PCRA 
was " `untenable or amount[ed] to a subterfuge to avoid 
federal review of a constitutional violation,' " that his due 
process rights were therefore violated, and that "federal 
habeas relief is mandated." Appellant's Br. at 26 (quoting 
Taylor v. Kinchleloe, 920 F.2d 599, 609 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 
We are not persuaded by this argument. First, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court plurality's interpretation of 
the PCRA was neither "an `obvious subterfuge to evade 
consideration of a federal issue,' " Mullaney v. Wilkur, 421 
U.S. 684, 691 n.11 (1975) (quoting Radio Station WOW, Inc. 
v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 129 (1945)) nor a"plainly 
untenable" interpretation in the sense possibly relevant here.7 
See Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17, 22 (1919). Buehl's 
charge of subterfuge flies in the face of the errors that the 
plurality made in his favor -- i.e., its erroneous factual 
assumption that trial counsel never sought a limiting 
instruction and its erroneous legal conclusion that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Supreme Court's decision in Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17, 
23 (1919), seems to be the origin of the Ninth Circuit's statement in 
Taylor, 920 F.2d at 609, that a federal court need not accept a state 
court's interpretation of state law if that interpretation is "untenable." 
(Taylor cited Knapp v. Caldwell, 667 F.2d 1253, 1260 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 1055 (1982), which in turn cited Ward.) 
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Strickland's prejudice prong was met. His suggestion that 
the plurality deliberately failed to mention 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann S 9543(a)(2)(v) (repealed 1995) in order to reach 
the result it desired overlooks the fact that the two 
dissenting justices, who would have granted relief, also 
relied exclusively on 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann S 9543(a)(2)(ii) 
(West 1998) and never mentioned 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann 
S 9543(a)(2)(v) (repealed 1995). Thus, wefind the charge of 
subterfuge to be groundless. 
 
Nor do we agree with Buehl that the plurality's 
interpretation of the PCRA was "plainly untenable." 
Assuming for the sake of argument that a federal habeas 
court may reject a state court's "plainly untenable" 
interpretation of state law, we find that this demanding test 
is not met. Since 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 9543(a)(2)(ii) 
(West 1998) specifically addresses claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, it was not "plainly untenable" for the 
plurality (and, indeed, for the entire Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court) to treat that provision, rather than the more general 
rule set out in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 9543(a)(2)(v) 
(repealed 1995), as the governing provision. Nor was it 
"plainly untenable" for the plurality to view the test 
prescribed in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 9543(a)(2)(ii) (West 
1998) (whether the ineffective assistance "so undermined 
the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication 
of guilt or innocence could have taken place") as more 
demanding than Strickland's prejudice prong (whether 
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would 
have been different"). 466 U.S. at 694. We express no view 
as to (a) whether we would agree with the pluralit y's 
interpretation of the PCRA if it were our prerogative to 
review that interpretation de novo or (b) whether it seems 
to us that this interpretation was consistent with prior state 
cases. Limiting ourselves to the narrow question whether 
the plurality's interpretation was "plainly untenable," we 
hold that it was not. 
 
Furthermore, even if we were to conclude otherwise, we 
would still not hold that Buehl is entitled to federal habeas 
corpus relief. Buehl wants us to overrule the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court's interpretation of Pennsylvania law (the 
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PCRA) while deferring to that court's interpretation of 
federal law (the Sixth Amendment standard for ineffective 
assistance of counsel). We see no basis for such an 
approach. If we were to hold that Buehl was entitled to 
PCRA relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim if 
he could establish "a violation of the federal Constitution 
that would require the granting of Federal habeas corpus 
relief," 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 9543(a)(2)(v) (repealed 
1995), we would go on to consider whether he had 
established such a constitutional violation. And as we have 
already discussed, we conclude that he has not. 
 
E. Trial counsel's failure to object to additi onal "other 
crimes" evidence. Buehl next argues that his trial counsel 
was constitutionally ineffective because he failed to object 
to the introduction of evidence regarding crimes other than 
the Pine Street and Kirkpatrick robberies. Buehl asserts 
that his trial attorney should have objected to the 
admissibility of Peter Ross's testimony that Buehl 
possessed a knife and killed with a knife, Ross's testimony 
that Buehl offered to kill Ross's enemies, Detective Richard 
Natoli's reference to the service of a search warrant on 
Buehl while he was incarcerated at Delaware County 
Prison, Miller's testimony that Buehl threatened to "get his 
PPK" and kill Miller and his friends, and Richard 
Kirkpatrick's testimony that the person who robbed him 
claimed to have shot two other people. Buehl argues that 
none of this testimony was admissible and that it was 
introduced solely to demonstrate his bad character and his 
propensity to commit murder. 
 
Observing that these references to other criminal activity 
were "neither extensive nor detailed," the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court rejected Buehl's argument on two grounds. 
Commonwealth v. Buehl, 658 A.2d 771, 778 n.6 (Pa. 1995). 
First, it held that Buehl failed to satisfy Strickland's 
performance prong, since his counsel might have had a 
reasonable basis for electing not to object to these 
statements. Because the statements were fleeting, the 
Court noted that "trial counsel may have wished to avoid 
emphasizing what might have gone relatively unnoticed by 
the jury." Id. Second, the Court concluded that there was 
no reasonable probability that these references changed the 
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outcome of the case. The Court therefore held that any 
prejudice created by these fleeting remarks was insufficient 
to establish constitutional violation. See id. 
 
We agree with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's 
analysis. An objection to these brief portions of testimony 
might have simply highlighted the statements for the jury. 
Accordingly, Buehl's claim fails the first prong of the 
Strickland analysis because he cannot overcome the 
presumption that his trial counsel's actions "might be 
considered sound trial strategy." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689. Moreover, as the District Court noted, several of the 
statements appear to have been admissible. For example, 
Miller's testimony that Buehl threatened to get his PPK is 
relevant to show that Buehl was in possession of the type 
of gun used in the murders. However, even if none of this 
evidence was properly admissible, since the testimony was 
such a small part of the inculpatory evidence presented 
against Buehl, there is no reasonable probability that the 
result of Buehl's trial would have been different if the 
evidence had been excluded, and therefore Buehl's 
argument also fails Strickland's prejudice requirement. 
 
F. Trial counsel's failure to object to prosecutor's 
summation. We next consider Buehl's claim that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
prosecutor's closing argument.8 Claiming that the 
prosecutor improperly vouched for witnesses and expressed 
his personal opinion regarding Buehl's guilt, Buehl 
maintains that his counsel's failure to object was 
unprofessional and prejudiced his defense. 
 
A prosecutor's expression of personal opinion about the 
credibility of witnesses or the guilt of a defendant creates a 
risk that the jury will "trust the Government's judgment 
rather than its own view of the evidence." United States v. 
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985). However, the fact that a 
prosecutor made improper statements is insufficient, by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Commonwealth asserts that Buehl failed to exhaust this issue 
and the issue discussed below regarding inconsistent jury verdicts. 
However, we conclude that these issues were exhausted because they 
were presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Buehl's pro se 
brief. 
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itself, to require a new trial. To obtain such relief, a 
defendant must also demonstrate that the prosecutor's 
improper statements prejudiced his defense. See United 
States v. Gross, 961 F.2d 1097, 1108 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing 
United States v. Swinehart, 617 F.2d 336, 339 (3d Cir. 
1980)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. U.S. 965 (1992). In examining 
whether the prosecutor's statements prejudiced the 
defense, our precedents have considered whether the 
comments suggested that the prosecutor had knowledge of 
evidence other than that which was presented to the jury. 
See id. 
 
In this case, the prosecutor stated that the police 
investigation had sought the truth, that several of the 
government witnesses were credible, and that the 
prosecutor had put his "heart and soul" into the case. 
These comments did not suggest to the jury that the 
prosecutor possessed evidence of guilt other than that 
which had been presented in open court. Rather, the 
comments merely expressed a belief that the evidence 
presented to the jury was credible. We have previously held 
this kind of comment insufficient to establish prejudice to 
the defense. See id. Furthermore, given the weight of the 
evidence against Buehl, a reasonable jury would not have 
found Buehl innocent had the prosecutor refrained from 
making these assertions. Accordingly, we conclude that 
Buehl cannot show the requisite prejudice to establish 
ineffective assistance of counsel on this claim. 
 
G. Trial counsel's failure to object to an ins truction on 
intent. Buehl's next argument is that his trial counsel's 
failure to object to the trial court's instruction on intent 
deprived him of effective assistance of counsel and denied 
him due process of law. Buehl complains that the following 
jury charge, which was delivered by the trial court, 
improperly established a mandatory presumption of intent: 
 
       In the trial of a person for committing or attempting to 
       commit a crime of violence the fact that he was armed 
       with a firearm, used or attempted to be used and had 
       no license to carry the same shall be evidence of his 
       intention to commit said crime of violence. 
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Joint App. 145. Buehl complains that the written verdict 
slip that the court gave to the jury contained the same 
language. 
 
Buehl is correct that a state may not establish a 
mandatory presumption of intent, see Francis v. Franklin, 
471 U.S. 311-12 (1985), and the use of the term "shall," 
rather than "may be," in the instruction at issue seems to 
offend that rule. Nevertheless, under the harmless error 
standard set out in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 
632, 637-38 (1993), it is clear that Buehl is not entitled to 
relief. A writ of habeas corpus should issue only if the 
reviewing court concludes that the instructional error "had 
a substantial and injurious effect or influence in 
determining the jury's verdict." Id. at 623. In this case, the 
nature of the prosecution's evidence and Buehl's defense 
rendered the error in this instruction harmless. Both the 
prosecution and defense either expressly or impliedly 
conceded that the killings at issue were done intentionally, 
and therefore the matter of Buehl's intent to kill was not an 
issue in his defense. Rather, Buehl based his entire defense 
on a claim of mistaken identity--that he was not the person 
who committed the murders. 
 
Moreover, it cannot reasonably be doubted that the 
assailant who attacked the Gross family and Mrs. 
VanderVeur intended to kill them. The victims were shot 
repeatedly at close range. One of the victims was shot in 
the head at close range, and another was tied to a chair 
before being shot. Accordingly, this case turned on the 
jury's assessment of the evidence regarding the identity of 
the killer. We therefore conclude that the court's 
instructional error on intent did not have a substantial and 
injurious effect on the jury's verdict. 
 
H. Failure to object to allegedly inconsistent  guilty 
verdicts. Buehl argues that his counsel was also 
constitutionally ineffective because he failed to object to the 
entry of inconsistent verdicts. With respect to each of the 
three victims, the jury found Buehl guilty of first degree 
murder, third degree murder, and involuntary 
manslaughter.9 Buehl notes that first and third degree 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The jury found Buehl not guilty of voluntary manslaughter. 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. S 2503 defines voluntary manslaughter as follows: 
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murder under Pennsylvania law requires an intent to kill 
and malice, whereas involuntary manslaughter requires 
neither.10 Consequently, Buehl argues that the verdicts are 
inconsistent and that the trial court would have been 
required to vacate them if his trial counsel had raised a 
timely objection.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (a) General Rule. -- A person who kills an indiv idual without 
lawful 
       justification commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the 
       killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting 
       from serious provocation by: 
 
       (1) the individual killed; or 
 
       (2) another whom the actor endeavors to kill, but he negligently or 
       accidentally causes the death of the individual killed. 
 
10. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 2502 (West 1998) provides: 
 
       (a) Murder of the first degree.--A criminal ho micide constitutes 
       murder of the first degree when it is committed by an intentional 
       killing. 
 
       . . . 
 
       (c) Murder of the third degree.--All other kinds  of murder shall 
be 
       murder of the third degree. Murder of the third degree is a felony 
of 
       the first degree. 
 
       (d) Definitions.--As used in this section the following words and 
       phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection: 
 
       . . . 
 
       "Intentional killing." Killing by means of poison, or by lying in 
wait, 
       or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated 
killing. 
 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 2504(a) (West 1998) provides: 
 
       A person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter when as a direct 
       result of the doing of an unlawful act in a reckless or grossly 
       negligent manner, or the doing of a lawful act in a reckless or 
       grossly negligent manner, he causes the death of another person. 
 
11. The District Court reconciled Buehl's murder and involuntary 
manslaughter convictions by reference to the Supreme Court's statement 
in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984), that a court may let stand 
inconsistent guilty and not-guilty verdicts because it is possible that 
"the 
jury, convinced of guilt, properly reached its conclusion on the [offense 
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In order to determine whether Buehl's trial attorney fell 
below the minimum level of competence demanded by the 
Sixth Amendment, we must first consider the governing 
legal rules regarding inconsistent guilty verdicts at the time 
when Buehl's trial ended in January 1983. The rule in the 
federal courts and in the courts of Pennsylvania had long 
been that a guilty verdict could not be attacked on the 
ground that it was inconsistent with a not-guilty verdict, 
see Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932); 
Commonwealth v. Kline, 164 A. 124 (1933),12 and in Harris 
v. Rivera, 454 U.S 339 (1981), the Supreme Court had held 
that this rule (generally called the Dunn Rule) was 
consistent with constitutional requirements. In a decision 
handed within a year after the Buehl verdicts, the United 
States Supreme Court reaffirmed the Dunn rule and 
disapproved decisions of several courts of appeal that had 
"begun to carve exceptions" to it. United States v. Powell, 
469 U.S. 57, 63 (1984). However, in a footnote, the Powell 
Court noted that its opinion was not "intended to decide the 
proper resolution of a situation where a defendant is 
convicted of two crimes, where a guilty verdict on one count 
logically excludes a finding of guilt on the other." Id. at 69 
n. 8. Years later, our court wrote that this exception to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
for which the guilty verdict was returned], and then through mistake, 
compromise, or lenity, arrived at an inconsistent conclusion of the 
[offense for which it returned the not-guilty verdict]." See Buehl, No. 
95- 
5917, slip op. at 68-69 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 1996) (citing Powell, 469 U.S. 
at 64); see also, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 1993 WL 55193 (9th Cir. 
Mar. 3, 1993). As noted above, however, the Supreme Court has 
expressly reserved decision on the question whether this rationale 
applies to cases where the jury returns inconsistent guilty verdicts, and 
we have stated that logically incompatible guilty verdicts may not stand. 
See Gross, 961 F.2d at 1106. 
 
12. In this situtation, the Supreme Court has reasoned, it is impossible 
to determine whether the prosecution or defense is prejudiced. It is 
entirely possible that the guilty verdict represents the jury's true 
assessment of the evidence and that the not-guilty verdict is based on 
"mistake, compromise, or lenity." Powell, 469 U.S. at 65. Therefore, it is 
not assumed that it is the defendant who is prejudiced, but the 
defendant is protected by the "independent review of the sufficiency of 
the evidence undertaken by the trial and appellate courts." Id. at 67. 
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Dunn rule "only operates in those situations where a jury 
has convicted a defendant of two crimes and those 
convictions are mutually exclusive." United States v. Gross, 
961 F.2d 1097, 1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 965 
(1992). We added that "[s]uch a result would be patently 
unjust because a defendant would be convicted of two 
crimes, at least one of which he could not have committed." 
See also Masoner v. Thurman, 996 F.2d 1003, 1005 (9th 
Cir.) ("a due process challenge to a jury verdict on the 
ground that convictions of multiple counts are inconsistent 
with one another will not be considered if the defendant 
cannot demonstrate that the challenged verdicts are 
necessarily logically inconsistent. If based on evidence 
presented to the jury any rational fact finder could have 
found a consistent set of facts supporting both convictions, 
due process does not require that the convictions be  
vacated."),13 cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1028 (1993). 
 
Because the Powell footnote and our opinion in Gross 
postdate the return of the verdicts at issue here, they are 
of little relevance in assessing the performance of Buehl's 
trial attorney. For present purposes, however, we will 
assume that Pennsylvania law at the time of Buehl's trial, 
as opposed to the federal constitution, recognized that as a 
general rule, if a jury returned logically inconsistent guilty 
verdicts and the defense objected, the judge was obligated 
to instruct the jury to retire and cure the inconsistency. See 
Commonwealth v. Brightwell, 424 A.2d 1263 (Pa. 1981). 
Nevertheless, we do not believe that Buehl's trial counsel 
"fell outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, in failing to object 
that the jury's verdicts of guilty on the charges offirst and 
third degree murder "logically exclude[d] afinding of guilt"14 
on the charge of involuntary manslaughter, and vice versa. 
 
An examination of the statutory definitions offirst degree 
murder, third degree murder, and involuntary 
manslaughter does not reveal any apparent logical 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Other courts, however, have expressed the view that the Dunn rule 
extends to cases in which the jury returns inconsistent guilty verdicts. 
See United States v. Grier, 866 F.2d 908, 929 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 
14. Powell, 469 U.S. at 69 n.8. 
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inconsistency in the verdicts. To be sure, the minimum 
requisite mens rea for each of these offenses differs, but the 
Pennsylvania Criminal Code generally follows the Model 
Penal Code rule that a lesser mens rea may be satisfied by 
proof of a greater one. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 302(e) 
(West 1998); Model Penal Code S 2.02(5).15 Thus, although 
involuntary manslaughter requires only recklessness or 
gross negligence,16 that element may be satisfied by proof 
that the defendant intentionally killed the decedent, as the 
first degree murder statute requires. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. S 2502(a) (West 1998). Accordingly, afinding that 
Buehl intentionally killed the victims (which is implicit in 
the verdicts of guilty of first degree murder) is logically 
consistent with a finding that the he caused their deaths 
through recklessness or gross negligence. 
 
In much the same way, the recklessness or gross 
negligence required for involuntary manslaughter could be 
viewed as subsumed within the element of malice needed 
for murder, which "may be found if the homicide is 
committed with an intent to kill, with an intent to inflict 
serious bodily harm, or with reckless disregard of the 
likelihood of death or serious bodily harm manifesting 
extreme indifference for the value of human life."17 Justice 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Model Penal Code S 2.02(5) provides: 
 
       (5) Substitutes for Negligence, Recklessness and Knowledge. When 
       the law provides that negligence suffices to establish an element 
of 
       an offense, such element also is established if a person acts 
       purposely, knowingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to 
       establish an element, such element also is established if a person 
       acts purposely or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to 
       establish an element, such element also is established if a person 
       acts purposely. 
 
Similarly, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 302(e) (West 1998) states: 
 
       Substitutes for negligence, recklessness and knowledge. -- When 
       the law provides that negligence suffices to establish an element 
of 
       an offense, such element also is established if a person acts 
       intentionally or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to 
       establish an element, such element also is established if a person 
       acts intentionally. 
 
16. See footnote 10, supra. 
 
17. Commonwealth v. Garcia, 378 A.2d 1199, 1206 n.11 (Pa. 1977) 
(plurality opinion). Pennsylvania cases define malice as "wickedness of 
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Roberts's plurality opinion in Commonwealth v. Garcia, 378 
A.2d 1199, 1205-07 & n.14 (Pa. 1977), made precisely this 
point. Justice Roberts carefully explained why the state of 
mind that suffices to establish the commission of 
involuntary manslaughter constitutes a lesser included 
kind of culpability with respect to the malice that is an 
essential element of murder, and he therefore concluded 
that the offense of involuntary manslaughter is included 
within the offense of murder. Id. It is difficult to see how 
involuntary manslaughter can be included within the 
offense of murder and yet be logically inconsistent with that 
offense. For this reason, courts in other jurisdictions have 
recognized that multiple guilty verdicts for the same 
conduct that are based on varying levels of mens rea are 
not mutually exclusive. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 
1993 WL 55193 (9th Cir. Mar. 3, 1993) (holding that 
verdicts will not be vacated where an alleged inconsistency 
flows from a conviction on a lesser included offense); 
Engram v. Hallahan, 1997 WL 579112 (9th Cir. Sept. 11, 
1997) (same). 
 
In view of these authorities, a lawyer whose performance 
met the Strickland standard of professional competence 
could have easily failed to perceive at the time in question 
that the Buehl verdicts might be attacked as inconsistent. 
This is not to say that Pennsylvania case law provided no 
basis for such argument. Commonwealth v. Brightwell, 424 
A.2d 1263, 1264 (Pa. 1981), which suggested that guilty 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
disposition, hardness of heart, wanton conduct, cruelty, recklessness of 
consequences and a mind regardless of social duty." Commonwealth v. 
Lopez, 627 A.2d 1229, 1230 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). Malice may also be 
found "where the principal acts in gross deviation from the standard of 
reasonable care, failing to perceive that such actions might create a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death or serious bodily injury." 
Stidman v. Midvale Sportsmen Club, 618 A.2d 945, 951 (Pa. Super. 
1992), appeal denied, 637 A.2d 290 (Pa. 1993). The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has stated that malice "consists of either an express 
intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm." Commonwealth v. Paquette, 
301 A.2d 837, 840 (Pa. 1973); see also Commonwealth v. Seibert, 622 
A.2d 361, 366 (Pa. 1993) (citing Commonwealth v. Pigg, 571 A.2d 438 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Commonwealth v. Kersten , 482 A.2d 600 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1984)). 
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verdicts for murder and voluntary manslaughter were 
inconsistent,18 furnished such a basis.19 But a lawyer's 
failure to perceive the ground for crafting an argument that 
might have succeeded is very different from the failure to 
meet the level of competence required by the Sixth 
Amendment. We thus hold that Buehl has failed to meet 
the first prong of the Strickland test. 
 
Nor do we think that the second Strickland prong is 
satisfied. If Buehl's trial attorney had objected that the 
verdicts were inconsistent, the most that the trial judge 
might have done was to direct the jury to retire and 
reconsider its verdict. Brightwell, 424 A.2d at 1264. In light 
of the evidence in this case -- which left little doubt that 
the perpetrator acted with a greater mens rea than that 
required for involuntary manslaughter -- we see no 
substantial likelihood that the jury (which subsequently 
sentenced Buehl to death) would have retracted its verdicts 
of first and third degree murder and found Buehl guilty of 
involuntary manslaughter only. It seems very likely that the 
jury initially found Buehl guilty of involuntary 
manslaughter, not because it concluded that he killed the 
victims unintentionally, but because it believed that his 
intent to kill, while more than required to prove involuntary 
manslaughter, was nevertheless sufficient. We thus hold 
that Buehl's trial attorney did not violate his client's Sixth 
Amendment rights by failing to object to the verdicts as 
inconsistent. 
 
I. Cumulative prejudice. As a final Sixt h Amendment 
argument, Buehl contends that, in applying Strickland, we 
must consider the cumulative prejudicial impact of the 
constitutional violations that he alleges. However, after 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. A defendant may be convicted of voluntary manslaughter if he acted 
"under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation 
. . . ." 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 2503(a) (West 1998). A defendant may 
also be convicted of voluntary manslaughter if he intentionally or 
knowingly kills the victim based on the unreasonable belief that the 
killing is justified. Id. The presence of these affirmative elements might 
be viewed as logically inconsistent with malice, but the offense of 
involuntary manslaughter contains no similar elements. 
 
19. See also Commonwealth v. Kemmerer, 584 A.2d 940, 945 (Pa. 1991), 
which came well after the Buehl verdicts. 
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conducting this review, we conclude that the District Court 
correctly determined that the overwhelming evidence of 
Buehl's guilt prevents him from satisfying Strickland's 
prejudice prong. 
 
III 
 
We turn now to Buehl's claim that the prosecution 
violated his due process rights by improperly withholding 
exculpatory and impeaching evidence. Buehl asserts that 
the prosecution did not inform his counsel that county 
detectives had overheard prosecution witness Joseph Dwyer 
state that he had seen Kelly in possession of his PPK a few 
weeks after the Gross family was murdered. Buehl also 
asserts that the government failed to disclose the full extent 
of Kelly and Dwyer's criminal histories, LaMotte's active 
probation status, and several alleged favors that the 
Commonwealth provided to Dwyer. Since Buehl's defense 
proceeded on the theory that Kelly--who was the owner of 
the PPK--was the real killer, Buehl asserts that the 
prosecution's failure to reveal this information deprived him 
of exculpatory evidence and impeachment material and 
thus denied him a fair trial. 
 
Due process requires the prosecution to inform the 
defense of evidence material to guilt or punishment. See 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The prosecution 
must also disclose evidence that goes to the credibility of 
crucial prosecution witnesses. See Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); United States v. Starusko, 729 
F.2d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 1984). However, the prosecution's 
failure to disclose such evidence amounts to a violation of 
due process only if there is a reasonable probability that 
the jury would have returned a different verdict if the 
information had been disclosed, or, stated differently, if "the 
Government's evidentiary suppression undermines 
confidence in the outcome of the trial." Kyles v. Whitney, 
514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). "[T]he Constitution is not violated 
every time the government fails or chooses not to disclose 
evidence that might prove helpful to the defense." Id. at 
436-37; see also United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 886 
(3d Cir. 1994) ("a Brady violation . . . does not mandate 
automatic reversal. . . . A reversal is warranted only where 
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the suppression of the Brady evidence undermines 
confidence in the outcome of the trial."). In evaluating 
whether the government's failure to turn over Brady or 
Giglio material undermines confidence in the outcome of 
the trial, the suppressed evidence is "considered 
collectively, not item-by-item." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436. 
 
In this case, the Commonwealth admits that it did not 
provide the information listed above but asserts that it was 
not required to provide all of that information. The 
Commonwealth argues that it was not required to inform 
Buehl of Dwyer's alleged statement because the prosecution 
was unable to verify whether Dwyer in fact made such a 
statement. When the prosecution investigated the 
detectives' report, Dwyer denied making the statement, and 
Kelly denied having possession of the PPK after the killings. 
 
The Commonwealth's argument misses the point. If 
Buehl's counsel had known about Dwyer's alleged 
statement, he could have asked Dwyer on cross- 
examination whether he had seen Kelly with the gun after 
the murders. If Dwyer had denied seeing Kelly in 
possession of the gun, the prior statement overheard by the 
detectives could have been used for impeachment, and the 
statement itself might have been admissible depending on 
how the detectives recorded Dwyer's statement. See 
Commonwealth v. Sholcosky, 719 A.2d 1039, 1044 (Pa. 
1998) (prior inconsistent statement is admissible as 
substantive evidence if it is embodied in an electronic, 
audiotaped or videotaped recording). 
 
Nevertheless, we conclude that Buehl's Brady argument 
lacks merit because the prosecution's failure to disclose the 
information is not sufficient to "undermine[ ] confidence in 
the outcome of the trial." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. Dwyer's 
statement that Kelly had the PPK several weeks after the 
murders does not seriously undercut the evidence that 
Buehl was in possession of the gun at the time of the 
murders. Buehl admitted that he used the PPK to rob the 
shop on Pine Street just two days before the Gross 
murders. On the same afternoon as the murders, the same 
PPK was used to rob the Kirkpatrick home, and Buehl sold 
jewelry stolen from the Kirkpatricks that same evening. On 
the afternoon of the murders, Buehl appeared in LaMotte's 
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office with a gun in his waistband and stated that he had 
just killed three people. Within a few days of the killings, 
Buehl told Miller that he had killed three people with a 
PPK, and Buehl threatened to "blow Miller away" with the 
same weapon. In light of this overwhelming evidence that 
Buehl had the PPK at the time of the killings and that he 
was the murderer, we conclude that Buehl was not 
seriously prejudiced by the inability to use Dwyer's 
statement for impeachment or to show that Kelly possessed 
the gun several weeks after the killings. 
 
Additionally, the government's failure to disclose its 
witnesses' complete criminal histories does not sufficiently 
undermine confidence in the outcome of his case because 
Buehl was informed that Dwyer had been convicted of theft 
and receiving stolen property and that Kelly had at least 
two prior convictions. Consequently, Buehl had an 
opportunity to discredit the government's witnesses. In fact, 
as the District Court noted, Buehl's counsel was able to 
discredit Dwyer and Kelly effectively at trial. 
 
Moreover, the government's failure to disclose Dwyer's 
alleged statement, the witnesses' complete criminal 
histories, and the alleged favors provided to Dwyer is offset 
by the significant amount of evidence presented against 
Buehl. Given the weight of this evidence and the mitigating 
factors discussed above, Buehl cannot show that the 
government's failure to disclose the information 
undermined confidence in the outcome of the trial. 
Accordingly, we reject Buehl's claim. 
 
IV. 
 
For the reasons set out above, we conclude that Buehl's 
trial and appellate counsel were not constitutionally 
ineffective and that his due process rights were not 
violated. We therefore affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
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